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Abstract 
The number of families headed by a parent with a disability has increased substantially 
during the past century, particularly those headed by parents with intellectual and/or developmental 
disabilities (Tymchuck, Llewellyn, & Feldman, 1999). However, many state statutes still include 
parents’ disabilities as grounds for termination of parental rights (TPR). This study searched the state 
codes of the fifty states and the District of Columbia relating to TPR. The majority of states include 
parents’ disabilities in their codes as grounds for TPR if a disability impacts a parent’s ability to care 
for his or her child or as a condition to take into consideration when determining whether a person 
is unfit to parent. As of August 2005, 37 states included disability-related grounds for TPR while 14 
states did not include disability language as grounds for termination. From this study, it appears 
many states include disability inappropriately in their TPR statutes, including using inappropriate, 
outdated terminology to refer to a person’s disability; and using imprecise definitions of disability. 
The use of disability language in TPR statutes can put an undue focus on the condition of having a 
disability rather than their parenting behavior.    
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Historically, social policy has regulated the parenting activities of people with disabilities in 
several different ways, including forced sterilization, institutionalization, and termination of parental 
rights. The overall policy landscape has changed for people with disabilities in many ways, and 
people with disabilities are more included in school, work and community settings. The federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibit state and local 
governments from discriminating against people with disabilities in their programs and services. 
However, these anti-discrimination laws do not cover child custody and child protection 
proceedings, and parents with disabilities still face discrimination in these arenas. 
  All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes outlining the grounds for 
terminating parental rights (TPR) in relation to child abuse and neglect. However, TPR and parents 
with disabilities are, in general, a neglected area of study and research. Although recent research has 
found that parents with disabilities are not more likely to maltreat their children than parents 
without disabilities (Glaun & Brown, 1999; Oyserman, Mowbray, Meares, & Firminger, 2000),  
evidence shows that courts have terminated parental rights based on an emphasis on a parent’s 
disability (Accardo & Whitman, 1989; Sackett, 1991; Watkins 1995).  
While a cursory analysis shows that many states include parental disability as statutory 
grounds for TPR (National Clearinghouse for Child Abuse and Neglect, 2002), there has been no 
formal analysis of the inclusion of disability as grounds for TPR in state codes. Thus, the purpose of 
this study is to examine how states are including disability in their TPR statutes, to identify state 
legislative innovations related to parents with disabilities, and to offer legislative change strategies for 
states considering updating child custody codes related to parents with disabilities. While this study 
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examines state TPR statutes from a broad view of disability, much of the supporting literature is 
specific to parents with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities.  
Background 
 As social attitudes and practices towards people with disabilities have evolved from 
institutionalization and compulsory sterilization to a community-based approach, the numbers of 
parents with disabilities have increased (Dowdney & Skuse, 1993; Llewellyn, 1990; Swain & 
Cameron, 2003; Tymchuck, Llewellyn, & Feldman, 1999). While their numbers have clearly grown, 
there are few accurate sources of information on the prevalence of parents with disabilities. Reasons 
for this lack of information include the lack of universally accepted definition of disability and the 
lack of administrative and research data on parents with disabilities (Sackett, 1991; Llewellyn, 1990; 
McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). The best estimate of the United States population of parents with 
disabilities comes from the National Health and Information Survey’s 1994/1995 Disability 
Supplement’s data on mothers of one or more children under the age of 18. Using this data, 
Anderson, Byun, Larson, and Lakin (2005) found that there were approximately 175,000 mothers 
with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities, and about 1.35 million mothers with significant 
functional limitations but not intellectual or developmental disabilities.  
Despite these increasing numbers, people with disabilities often struggle with family, 
community, and social ambivalence about their becoming parents (Ackerson, 2003; Llewellyn, 1990).  
Parents with disabilities face social stereotypes and prejudicial presumptions that they will inevitably 
maltreat their children or put them at risk from others, or that they have irremediable parenting 
deficiencies that put their children at risk and risk their developmental outcomes (Ackerson, 2003; 
McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002; Sackett, 1991). Many child welfare protocols indicate that a parental 
disability is a high risk for abuse so parents with disabilities may experience higher scrutiny from 
child protection agencies.  
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Currently no national studies of the number of parents with disabilities who have been 
involved in the child welfare system exist. Most child welfare agencies do not collect data on parents 
with disabilities; therefore, information available is from very small studies or anecdotal information. 
There have been estimates that between 40% and 60% of children of parents with intellectual 
disabilities have been removed from the home (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002).  Studies of child 
protection court proceedings have found that parents with disabilities are often disproportionately 
involved in the child protection system (Glaun & Braun, 1999; Swain & Cameron, 2003; Taylor et 
al., 1991). Parents with disabilities who are involved with the child protection system are more likely 
to be facing allegations of neglect than of abuse or risk of abuse (Collentine, 2005; McConnell & 
Llewellyn, 2002). Swain and Cameron (2003) examined the perceptions of the court system among 
parents with disabilities and found that parents with disabilities reported that they suffer prejudicial 
or discriminatory treatment from child protection and the courts. Glaun and Braun (1999) 
characterized the court’s approach to child protection with parents with disabilities as one of “risk 
management,” where the children’s rights are balanced against the rights of the parents.   
Parents with certain types of disabilities, such as intellectual disabilities, are likely to have 
other risk factors that trigger their involvement with child welfare (Dowdney & Skuse, 1992; 
McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Parents with intellectual disabilities often come from families that 
have experienced poverty and social exclusion (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002; Swain & Cameron, 
2003). Many parents with intellectual disabilities have reported being abused or neglected 
themselves, social isolation, little extended family support, meager incomes, and welfare dependence 
(McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002; Tymchuck, Llewellyn, & Feldman, 1999). Parents with intellectual 
and/or developmental disabilities are not the only parents with disabilities being observed in relation 
to risks for child maltreatment.  In their study on parental fitness of people with psychiatric 
diagnoses, Benjet, Azar, and Kuersten-Hogan (2003) found that mental illness as predictor of abuse 
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is less significant than other perpetrator characteristics, such as poverty, stress, history of abuse, and 
social isolation. Unfortunately, as Swain and Cameron (2003) found, “…disability tends to be seen 
as the principle determinant of inability to care for children, but where poverty, housing issues, and 
the like are also present, these are seen as further confirmation of parental inadequacy” (p.167).  
Despite disproportionately greater involvement in the child welfare system, a growing body 
of research on the outcomes for children of parents with disabilities does not necessarily support the 
assumption that parents with disabilities are more likely to abuse or neglect their children. Studies 
have found that children of parents with intellectual disabilities can have successful outcomes 
(McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Other studies have indicated that it is impossible to predict 
parenting outcomes based on the results of intelligence testing (Dowdney & Skuse, 1992). However, 
laws addressing parents with disabilities have tended to focus on disability in a categorical fashion 
rather than looking at individual parenting behaviors or abilities. 
The Legal Status of Parents with Disabilities 
The United States legal system has been involved in regulating parenting activities since the 
19th century, including efforts to regulate fertility and to protect children. Sterilization of people 
with disabilities was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1927, and subsequent court 
decisions have continued to classify mental retardation or developmental disability as a legal 
condition that may require specific guidance or limitations (Watkins, 1995).  
Since the mid to late 19th century, states have taken legal steps to protect the rights of 
children (Sackett, 1991). As early as 1851, a state laws provided that the courts may “… in their 
sound discretion, and when the morals, or safety, or interests of the children strongly require it, 
withdraw the infants from the custody of the father or mother, and place the care and custody of 
them elsewhere” (Kent, 1851, p.211). All states adopted versions of child welfare laws, which 
protect children via many interventions ranging from temporary removal from parental custody to 
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TPR. When a parent’s rights are terminated, there is a severance of the legal relationship between 
the parent and child and, generally, a permanent separation of the parent from the child (Sackett, 
1991).  A 1982 Supreme Court decision, Santosky vs. Kramer, found that courts could not terminate 
parental rights based on presumptions of “ascribed status,” in this case a father’s unwed status, but 
through individual inquiry regarding the specific person’s ability to parent their child effectively 
(Watkins, 1995).   
 In an effort to create more uniform protections for children, model statute language for TPR 
was proposed by the Neglected Children Committee of the National Council of Juvenile Court 
Judges in 1976 (Lincoln, 1976). It was written as a model that state legislatures could adopt or adapt 
to improve their current statutes (Lincoln, 1976).   The model language states that state courts may 
terminate parental rights when the Court: 
…finds the parent unfit or that the conduct or condition of the parent is such 
as to render him/her unable to properly care for the child and that such 
conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.  In 
determining unfitness, conduct, or condition, the Court shall consider, but is 
not limited to the following: … Emotional illness, mental illness or mental 
deficiency of the parent of such duration or nature as to render the parent 
unlikely to care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the 
child (Lincoln, 1976, p.7). 
Many states adopted this language verbatim into their child welfare statutes.  
Statutes that include disability as grounds for termination may lead to the presumption that 
disability is equivalent to parental unfitness, justifying state intervention (Watkins, 1995). 
Presumptions of unfitness to parent often lead to parents losing custody of their children before 
birth under a theory of prospective neglect (Collentine, 2005; Watkins, 1995). Court studies have 
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found that “…the presumption of incompetence evoked by the diagnosis of intellectual disability is 
so influential that evidence challenging it may not be readily accepted” (McConnell & Llewellyn, 
2002, p.309). Parenting abilities of parents with disabilities are often ignored in favor of 
presumptions about the parenting abilities of all people with disabilities. For example, Watkins 
(1995) documents cases in Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina and New York where courts have 
made decisions to terminate parental rights for people with disabilities based on expert testimony 
focusing on presumptions of unfitness by parents with disabilities based on the characteristics about 
people with certain disability labels, rather than observation of individual parenting abilities (In re 
Karen Y., 550 N.Y.S.2d 67, (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Orangeburg County Department of Social 
Services v. Harley, 393 S.E. 2d 597.2d 597, (S.C. Ct. App. 1990); 563 N.E.2d 1200, (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990); C.L.R. v. Russo, 567 So. 2d 703,( La. Ct. App. 1990)). Further, Watkins (1995) documents 
how parents with disabilities have often lost their parental rights upon the birth of their children or 
after they had not been provided with appropriate reunification services. Challenges to current state 
statutes that include a parent’s disability status have been made citing the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Sackett, 1991) and Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (Watkins, 1995). To date, none of these challenges has been successful.   
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), designed in part to shorten the stay of 
abused or neglected children in foster care, has mandated that state courts become even more 
involved in TPR. ASFA required TPR in cases where a child has been in foster care 15 of the most 
recent 22 months, when a child has been abandoned, or when a parent has committed or been 
involved in murder, voluntary manslaughter, or felonious assaults of one of their children. Since 
1997, all states have added the ASFA requirement to their state codes (National Clearinghouse on 
Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002). In addition to the ASFA related TPR grounds, most 
states have additional grounds for terminating parental rights, some which date back many decades.  
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States vary in their non-ASFA related grounds with some having extensive and explicit lists of 
grounds for termination and others having very limited and/or very broad grounds for termination. 
Examples of other common grounds include chronic substance abuse, failure to maintain contact 
with a child, or failure to maintain support of a child (National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and 
Neglect Information, 2002). 
At the time of the adoption of ASFA, a national taskforce reminiscent of the Neglected 
Children Committee of 1976 was formed called Adoption 2002: The President's Initiative on 
Adoption and Foster Care. In 1997, Adoption 2002 released its Guidelines for Public Policy and 
State Legislation Governing Permanence for Children (National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and 
Neglect Information, 2002). These guidelines were being developed simultaneously to the adoption 
of the ASFA legislation and, thus, include many recommendations to states related to the new 
emphasis on permanency for children.  Strikingly similar to the 1976 Committee, the Adoption 2002 
Initiative again included a recommendation that states include parental incapacity in TPR statutes 
(National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002).   While parental incapacity 
can be defined in a number of ways, it is often defined to include a parent’s disability (National 
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, 2002). Adoption 2002 specifically states 
that: 
many [state codes] do not make it clear that, in some cases, sufficient 
evidence of parental incapacity is enough to establish grounds for 
termination (National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect 
Information, 2002). 
Thus, these recommendations appear to still promote TPR based either partially or 
primarily on a disability in instances when parents’ incapacity is a disability. 
 
 
 
   
8 
 The purpose of this study is to ascertain the current legislative status of parents with 
disabilities within state TPR statutes. Although states may have policy directives (i.e. agency 
practices), which provide alternative guidance for decision outcomes for parents with disabilities, 
state statutes remain at the crux of the issue. Since more and more parents with disabilities of all 
types are having children, it is important to understand the extent to which states focus on parental 
disability within TPR statues and the nature of the discussion of parental disability.  
Methodology 
This study used legal document analysis consisting of a comprehensive Boolean search of 
the state codes of the fifty states and District of Columbia relating to TPR using the most recent 
state code available on Lexis-Nexis in August 2005. TPR and related statutes were searched for 
contemporary and historical terms related to disability and their common cognates, such as: 
disability, mental, handicap, disorder, and incapacity. When language surrounding disability was 
found in codes relating to child welfare, this language was then searched throughout the entire state 
code to see how these terms were defined elsewhere. For example, if “emotional illness” was used in 
the TPR code of a certain state, the entire state code was searched for a definition of “emotional 
illness.” Further, definitions for child welfare terms such as “unfit parent” and “best interest of the 
child” were explored to see if these were statutorily defined elsewhere as specifically including or 
excluding parental disability. Two researchers independently conducted the searches, and the 
searches were reconciled by going over findings on a state-by-state basis. A code list was then 
developed to measure for preciseness, scope, use of language, and references to accessibility or 
fairness, and statutes were reanalyzed, and groupings developed.  
Results 
Parental Disability in State TPR Statutes 
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The majority of states include parent’s disability in their codes as grounds for TPR if a 
disability impacts a parent’s ability to care for his or her child or as a condition to take into 
consideration when determining whether a person is unfit to parent. As of August 2005, 37 states 
included disability-related grounds for TPR while 14 states did not include disability language as 
grounds for termination. The vast majority of these state statutes related to parental disability use 
outdated terminology, have imprecise definitions of disability, and emphasize conditions rather than 
behaviors. 
All of the states that include disability in their grounds for termination specify explicit types 
of disabilities for courts to consider. Currently, 36 states have specific grounds for mental illness, 32 
have specific grounds for intellectual or developmental disability, eighteen have grounds for 
emotional illness, and seven have grounds of physical disability (see Table 1). Two states, Missouri 
and Tennessee, also use the generic mental condition, which can imply a mental illness or an 
intellectual or developmental disability. North Carolina is the only state that also specifies organic 
brain syndrome as a specific disability to consider when terminating parental rights. Eleven states 
use a common combination of disability types, “emotional illness, mental illness and mental 
deficiency,” that came directly from the Neglected Children Committee of the National Council of 
Juvenile Court Judges of 1976. 
Outdated Terminology and Imprecise Definitions 
The vast majority of the state codes relating to terminating parental rights use outdated 
terminology when discussing a parent’s disability. Many codes use language from the 1940s and 
1950s. This archaic language does not easily translate to contemporary legal, medical, or social 
definitions of disability.  Further, many people in the United States consider the type of language 
contained in the state statutes to be offensive. 
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An example of the outdated language seen in the state codes is in reference to parents with 
intellectual or developmental disabilities. Thirty-two state codes include a reference to a disability 
that in modern terminology would consist of an intellectual or developmental disability (I/DD).  
However, the term intellectual disability is never used, and developmental disability is only used by 
three states. The most commonly used description of I/DD in statutes is “mental deficiency,” used 
by 21 states. The term mental deficiency was in common usage in the United States from the 1940s 
through the 1960s with the main professional association called the American Association on Mental 
Deficiency through the 1970s. However, this term fell out of favor and by the 1970s was replaced by 
the term mental retardation. Now both terms are considered pejorative with many advocates and 
researchers recently adopting the term intellectual disability as a more respectful term for mental 
retardation. The term developmental disability is a broader term than mental retardation and 
includes other types of disabilities occurring during the developmental period, such as cerebral palsy, 
that may not involve an intellectual disability. 
The states using the more modern terms developmental disabilities or mental retardation in 
their TPR statutes tend to have much more precise definitions of the disability. All three of the 
states using the term developmental disabilities relied on a state definition of developmental 
disabilities, which generally mirrors the federal definition. Likewise, most of the eight states that use 
the term mental retardation or mentally retarded have a precise definition of mental retardation that 
is similar to standard diagnostic usage. Twenty-one states use the very outdated term “mental 
deficiency” with no state definition of mental deficiency anywhere within their state code. As there is 
no modern definition of this term, courts have to rely on precedent that may be well out of date.   
Similarly, 18 states include a reference to emotional disability with thirteen referring to it as 
emotional illness, two as emotional health, and one each as emotional disability, emotional 
disturbance, and emotional status. Like the term mental deficiency, the term emotional illness does 
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not have an agreed upon current definition by medical, psychological, or advocacy groups. While the 
term emotional disturbance is often used in reference to children who have functional impairments, 
it does not refer to a particular diagnosis and most often is used for people under age 18 (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1999). Emotional illness was not defined in any of the 
state codes except to say that it must not be transitory. In a number of states, the only place the term 
emotional illness is used in the entire state code is in the child welfare statutes. 
Likewise, while mental illness is the most commonly included disability in TPR statutes, 
many states either have no definition of their terminology related to mental illness, or else a very 
broad definition of mental illness. For example, Colorado’s code allows for TPR if there exists clear 
and convincing evidence of “emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent of 
such duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely within a reasonable time to care for the 
ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs and conditions of the child” (C.R.S. 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) 
(2004)).  There is no definition of mental illness provided in the particular section of the code nor is 
there direction given as to an appropriate definition that may be present in other parts of the code.  
Other states have mental illness more explicitly defined, generally by using a general state definition 
of the term.  
Several states have more narrowly defined definitions of how mental illness can be used for 
terminating parental rights, usually including severity and/or chronicity.  For example, Iowa’s state 
code specifies that parental rights may be terminated if a parent has a chronic mental illness, has 
been repeatedly institutionalized, and presents a danger to his or herself or others (Iowa Code § 
232.116 (2004)).  Similarly, Wisconsin limits the use of mental illness as grounds for termination 
solely for individuals who are currently hospitalized and have been hospitalized for two of the 
previous five years (Wis. Stat. § 48.415 (2004)). 
Focus on Conditions rather than Behaviors 
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A major concern about the inclusion of disability in the grounds for TPR is that it can shift 
the focus from a parent’s behavior to a parent’s condition. Almost all of the non-disability related 
grounds for TPR are based on parent’s past or current behaviors, such as neglect, abuse, or 
abandonment.  While no states have criteria indicating that having a disability is, by itself, grounds 
for termination, it is one of the only grounds for termination based on a contributing factor to a 
parent’s behavior rather than the parent’s behavior itself. By contrast, of the many states that include 
failing to financially support a child as means for termination, none lists the causes of lack of 
financial support in their statutes, such as chronic unemployment or lack of a high school diploma.  
Currently, there are 14 states that do not refer to a parent’s disability in their state TPR 
statutes.  All of these states include language in their codes allowing states to terminate parental 
rights based on abusive or neglectful behavior of a parent that may be influenced by his or her 
disability.  However, with disability not included in the state statute, the focus necessarily has to be 
more on the individual’s behavior rather than the individual’s condition.    
 
 
Discussion 
The findings from this study show that many states include disability in their TPR related 
statutes. While including disability language in TPR statutes does not mean that all or even most 
parents with disabilities are at risk for having their children removed if they come in contact with the 
court system, it does point to a risk that parents with disabilities may face. While no state focused 
solely on disability as a cause for TPR and many courts in states that include disability in their state 
code have concluded that disability alone is not a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights (In re 
Michael B., 604 N.W. 2d 405, 412 (Neb. 2000)), there is a chance that the child protection system 
will put a heavier emphasis on disability if it is included in the state statute. 
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The inclusion of disability within state statutes is different from many of the other grounds 
for TPR required by ASFA. When disability is included in a state statute, it can place the emphasis 
on the mental or physical diagnosis of the parent rather than the ability for a parent to nurture and 
provide a safe environment for his or her child. While most professionals involved in the child 
welfare system might remain focused on parenting, it could become more difficult when the court 
proceedings place an emphasis on the diagnosis rather than specific parental behavior. 
From this study, it appears that many states that include disability do so in an inappropriate 
manner using outdated terminology to refer to a person’s disability, or using imprecise definitions of 
disability. Terms such as emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency are vague. Such 
vaguely worded state statutes tie disability with a parent’s inability to care for the child but are not 
specific in what this means or how child protection and the courts should interpret the statutes 
(Collentine, 2005).  The advantage of vague language is that it allows child protection authorities and 
the courts flexibility to adapt interventions and findings to best meet the specific needs of each case. 
However, vague laws can also lead to imbalanced interpretation and enforcement, as previous court 
studies have found (McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002). Of the states that do not include disability-
related language in their TPR statues, all had general provisions that would allow TPR of parents 
with disabilities though such a TPR would focus on the individual’s parental behavior rather than 
disability status.   
As a result of this review of state statues and the potential for discrimination, there is clearly 
a need for child welfare agencies to review their terminology concerned disabilities, especially 
relating to TPR, and perhaps change their statutes to deemphasize the disability of the parent and 
refocus on behavior. Indeed, there is evidence that states are interested in this change. Rhode Island 
and Idaho have recently changed the language about disability within their state TPR statutes. The 
rationale in both states was that the disability language was unnecessary and could result in unequal 
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treatment in the state courts for people with disabilities. In Idaho, the state not only eliminated the 
disability language but also inserted protections for people with disabilities, and inserted a provision 
in child protection and adoption statutes that parents with disabilities have the opportunity to show 
how their use of adaptive equipment can aid in their parenting (Lightfoot, LaLiberte & Hill, 2007; 
Idaho Code §16-1501b; Idaho Code §16-1506: Idaho Code §16-1601-1643;  Idaho Code §16-2001-
2015; & Idaho Code §32-1005). 
While this study provides a comprehensive overview of the extent to which state TPR 
statutes include disability language, it is limited in several ways. First, this study only focuses on the 
state codes and does not examine how parents with disabilities have fared under state codes that 
include or do not include disability language. Thus, this study does not examine the link between 
state codes and the decision-making processes of the child welfare and court systems nor does it 
examine the link between the codes and the decision outcomes. Second, while court records in most 
states were studied as background information for this project, there was no systematic attempt to 
see how courts were interpreting state statutes. Certainly, the language in a state statute is only one 
of many factors that can influence the termination of parental rights, and this study does not 
examine the broader array of influences. Future research in this area could explore further the 
relationship between these varied influences including examining how the various actors in the TPR 
process view parents with disabilities, and what types of guidance, such as state statutes, policy 
directives, professional experience, personal knowledge, evidence-base, they rely on when making 
decisions. Likewise, more inquiry is needed into how parents with disabilities fare when 
encountering the child welfare system with attention placed on both child and parent outcomes.  
Conclusion 
Many state statutes continue to institutionalize discriminatory language regarding disability 
and, therefore, potentially enable discriminatory practices that could cause unnecessary concerns 
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about the safety of children and unnecessarily disrupt their permanence and well-being. While many 
state court decisions have clearly ruled that disability alone is not a sufficient basis to terminate 
parental rights, previous research has also found that parents with disabilities are often at a 
disadvantage in court proceedings surrounding the custody of their children (Collentine, 2005; 
McConnell & Llewellyn, 2002; Swain & Cameron, 2003), which may be due in part to the vague 
language and guidance provided by state statutes. Clearly, parents with disabilities should be 
evaluated based on their ability to parent rather than on a categorical decision based on a permanent 
condition. While some people with disabilities may have disability-related factors limiting their ability 
to parent, others with disabilities may not. There certainly is a possibility that individual worker 
decisions, state or county policy directives, or judicial decision-making have more of an impact than 
the language in the state laws, but state TPR laws do provide the guidelines for the actors within the 
system. 
States should review their child welfare statutes for terminology concerning disabilities in 
their assessment and other processes, not solely regarding termination of parental rights. During this 
review, some states may find that they indeed need to clearly emphasize behavior rather than the 
condition of the parent in their state statues, and states may want to consider removing disability 
language from these state statutes. States that include language focusing on the condition of having a 
disability risk taking the emphasis away from the parenting behavior. Considering that states which 
do not have disability listed within their statutes are still able to terminate parental rights based on 
abuse or neglect, there appears to be no compelling reason to include disability within the statutes.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
16 
REFERENCES 
Accardo, P. J., & Whitman, B. Y. (1989). Factors influencing child abuse/neglect in children of 
 mentally retarded parents. Pediatric Research, 25, 95. 
Ackerson, B. (2003). Parents with serious and persistent mental illness: issues in assessment and  
 services. Social Work, 48 (2), 187-194. 
Anderson, L., Byun, S.,  Larson, S. & Lakin, C.  (2005). Mothers with disabilities-characteristics and  
outcomes: An analysis of from the 1994/1994 NHIS-D. DD Data Brief, 17 (3). Minneapolis, 
MN: Institute on Community Integration. 
Benjet, C., Azar, S., & Kuersten-Hogan, R. (2003). Evaluating the parental fitness of psychiatrically  
diagnosed individuals: Advocating a functional-contextual analysis of parenting. Journal of 
Family Psychology, 17 (2), 238-251. 
Collentine, A. (2005). Respecting intellectually disabled parents: A call for change in state  
 termination of parental rights statutes. Hofstra Law Review, 535, 1-25. 
Dowdney, L, & Skuse, D. (1993). Parenting provided by adults with mental retardation. Journal of  
 Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 34 (1), p.25-47. 
Glaun, D. & Brown, P. (1999). Motherhood, intellectual disability and child protection:  
Characteristics of a court sample. Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disability, 24 (1), 95-
105. 
Kent, J. (1851) American Law Volume 2 (7th edition). New York: William Kent. 
Lightfoot, E. & LaLiberte, T. (2006, October). The inclusion of disability as grounds for  
 termination of parental rights in state codes.  Policy Research Brief 17, (2). Retrieved   
 September 20, 2007 from: Http://ici.umn.edu/products/newsletters.html#policy. 
Lightfoot, E., LaLiberte, T. & Hill, K. (2007). Guide for Creating Legislative Change: Disability in the 
termination of parental rights and other child custody statutes. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
 
 
 
   
17 
Lincoln, J. (1976). Model Statue for Termination of Parental Rights.  Juvenile Justice (5), 3-8. 
Llewellyn, G. (1990). People with intellectual disability as parents: Perspectives from the professional  
 literature. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Developmental Disabilities, 16 (4), 369-380. 
McConnell, D. & Llewellyn, G. (2002). Stereotypes, parents with intellectual disability, and child  
 protection.  Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 24 (3), 297-317. 
National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information. (2002). Grounds for termination of  
parental rights. Washington, DC: National Clearninghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect 
Information. 
Oyserman, D., Mowbray, C. T., Meares, P., & Firminger, K. B. (2000). Parenting among mothers  
 with a serious mental illness. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 70(3), 296-315. 
Sackett. R. (1991). Terminating the parental rights of the handicapped. Family Law Quarterly, 25 (3),  
 253-298. 
Swain, P. & Cameron, N. (2003). ‘Good Enough Parenting’: Parental disability and child protection.  
 Disability and Society, 18 (2), 165-177. 
Taylor, C., Norman, D., Murphy, J., Jellinek, M., Quinn, D., Poitrat, F., & Goshko, M. (1991).  
Diagnosed intellectual and emotional impairment among parents who seriously mistreat their 
children: prevalence, type, and outcome in a court sample. Child Abuse & Neglect, 15, 389-
401. 
Tymchuck , Llewellyn, & Feldman (1999). Parenting by persons with intellectual disabilities: A  
timely international perspective. Journal of Intellectual & Developmental Disability, 24 (1) 3-6. 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1999). Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General. 
Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Mental Health Services, National 
Institutes of Health, National Institute of Mental Health. 
 
 
 
   
18 
Watkins, C. (1995). Beyond status: The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights of  
People labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded. California Law Review, 83 (6), 
1415-1475.  
 
 
 
   
19 
Table 1 
Disability language in state termination of parental rights statutes 
State Disability 
included 
in TPR 
grounds 
Intellectual or 
developmental 
disabilities in 
TPR grounds 
Mental 
Illness 
in TPR 
grounds 
Emotional 
illness in 
TPR 
grounds 
Physical 
Disability 
in TPR 
grounds 
Other 
disability 
in TPR 
grounds 
Disability language used 
within statutes 
Alabama Yes X X X   Emotional illness, Mental 
illness, Mental deficiency 
Alaska Yes X X X   Mental illness, Serious 
emotional disturbance, Mental 
deficiency 
Arizona Yes X X    Mental illness, Mental 
deficiency 
Arkansas Yes X X X   Mental illness, Emotional 
illness, Mental deficiencies 
California Yes X X    Developmentally disabled, 
Mentally ill, Mentally disabled, 
Mental incapacity’ Mental 
disorder 
Colorado Yes X X X   Emotional illness, Mental 
illness, Mental deficiency 
Connecticut No       
Delaware Yes X X    Mental illness, 
Psychopathology, Mental 
retardation, Mental deficiency 
District of 
Columbia 
Yes  X X X  Physical, mental and 
emotional health 
Florida No       
Georgia Yes  X X X  Medically verifiable deficiency 
of the parent’s physical, 
mental, or emotional health 
Hawaii Yes X X    Mentally ill, Mentally retarded 
Idaho No       
Illinois Yes X X X   Mental impairment, Mental 
illness, Mental retardation, 
Developmental disability 
Indiana No       
Iowa Yes  X    Chronic mental illness and has 
been repeatedly 
institutionalized 
Kansas Yes X X X X  Emotional illness, Mental 
illness, Mental deficiency, 
Physical disability 
Kentucky Yes X X    Mental illness, Mental 
retardation 
Louisiana No       
Maine No       
Maryland Yes X X    Mental disorder, Mental 
retardation 
Massachusetts Yes X X    Mental deficiency, Mental 
illness 
Michigan No       
Minnesota No       
Mississippi Yes X   X  Severe mental deficiencies, 
Extreme physical 
incapacitation 
Missouri Yes     X Mental condition (undefined) 
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State Disability 
included 
in TPR 
grounds 
Intellectual or 
developmental 
disabilities in 
TPR grounds 
Mental 
Illness 
in TPR 
grounds 
Emotional 
illness in 
TPR 
grounds 
Physical 
Disability 
in TPR 
grounds 
Other 
disability 
in TPR 
grounds 
Disability language used 
within statutes 
Montana Yes X X X   Emotional illness, Mental 
illness, Mental deficiency 
Nebraska Yes X X    Mental illness, Mental 
deficiency 
Nevada Yes X X X   Emotional illness, Mental 
illness, Mental deficiency 
New 
Hampshire 
Yes X X    Mental deficiency, Mental 
illness 
New Jersey No       
New Mexico Yes X X  X X Physical disorder or 
incapacity, Mental disorder or 
incapacity, Hospitalization 
New York Yes X X    Mental illness, Mental 
retardation 
North 
Carolina 
Yes X X   X Mental retardation, Mental 
illness, Organic brain 
syndrome 
North Dakota Yes X X X X  Physical illness or disability, 
Mental illness or disability,  
Emotional illness or disability  
Other illness or disability 
Ohio Yes X X X X  Chronic mental illness, 
Chronic emotional illness’ 
Mental retardation 
Physical disability 
Oklahoma Yes X X    Mental illness, Mental 
deficiency 
Oregon Yes X X X   Emotional illness, Mental 
illness,  
Mental Deficiency 
Pennsylvania No       
Rhode Island No       
South 
Carolina 
Yes X X  X  Mental deficiency, Mental 
illness, Extreme physical 
incapacity 
South Dakota No       
Tennessee Yes  X X   Mental condition, Mental and 
emotional status 
Texas Yes X X X   Mental or emotional illness, 
Mental deficiency 
Utah Yes X X X   Emotional illness, Mental 
illness, Mental deficiency 
Vermont No       
Virginia Yes X X X   Mental or emotional illness, 
Mental deficiency 
Washington Yes X X    Psychological incapacity, 
Mental deficiency 
West Virginia Yes X X X   Emotional illness, Mental 
illness, Mental deficiency 
Wisconsin Yes X X   X Presently, and for at least two 
of the previous five years, has 
been an inpatient at a hospital, 
licensed treatment facility or 
state treatment facility due to 
mental illness of 
developmental disability 
Wyoming No       
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State Disability 
included 
in TPR 
grounds 
Intellectual or 
developmental 
disabilities in 
TPR grounds 
Mental 
Illness 
in TPR 
grounds 
Emotional 
illness in 
TPR 
grounds 
Physical 
Disability 
in TPR 
grounds 
Other 
disability 
in TPR 
grounds 
Disability language used 
within statutes 
Totals 
 
Yes - 37 
No – 14 
      
 
 
 
